Coinciding trends
We have now reviewed four datasets: a democracy index, a study of news deserts at local and regional levels in EU countries, a media pluralism index for EU countries and five candidate countries, and a combination of two different media freedom indexes.
The rise of social networks and digitalization, along with their impact on the traditional media economy and competition for users’ attention, are well-known factors of significance for several of the trends analyzed. In all the datasets we reviewed, the role of social networks is frequently mentioned, to varying degrees and in different contexts. Our interview subjects also address these topics.
We have chosen to interview experts for their professional insight on the datasets discussed or the media industry in various countries. Some are from academia, while others are industry practitioners, and in selecting them we have focused on geographic diversity and familiarity with different political and socioeconomic contexts.
This report aims to provide reasonable speculations based on probable interpretations of facts, with the hope of contributing to a broader discussion of the issues raised.
After analyzing the four previously mentioned datasets, we observe a negative trend in each, although in distinct ways:
- Democracy Index: The democracy index indicates that the level of democracy in the EU is weakening, mirroring global trends. This does not imply that a large number of countries in Europe have lost their liberal democracies over the last 10-15 years; rather, the political forces at play increase the likelihood that more countries may follow those that have already shifted towards illiberalism. Hungary has been on the illiberal side for many years, and Poland, following the recent election, is currently attempting to re-establish its liberal democracy.
- Study of News Deserts: The recent study on news deserts in rural Europe – examining the development of local and community media in EU countries – shows that journalistic coverage in rural areas varies greatly between countries. However, this study generally indicates that increasingly larger areas are becoming news deserts. A surprising finding in this study is that there is a lack of local editorial coverage in several cities, particularly in growing urban areas where editorial initiatives have not kept pace.
- Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM): Data from the MPM shows that media diversity is weakening, largely due to a deteriorating media economy and increasing economic and politically motivated interference in media independence. On a positive note, there are signs of improvement in one measurement area of the MPM, likely due to new regulations against SLAPPs, better protection for whistleblowers, and the recently adopted European Media Freedom Act.
- Press Freedom Index: Reporters Without Borders (RFS) Media Freedom Index shows that only three of the 29 countries surveyed (EU + 2) made progress in media freedom score from 2013 – 2024. The “Editorial Independence” indicator in the report “Uncovering News Deserts in Europe” is not an index but is based on risk assessments from experts in each country, which broadly confirms the trends seen in RSF’s index.
The economic strength of European media companies is, naturally, an important factor for the analysis conducted in this report. The development has been well known for many years, and therefore we have chosen not to go into detail on this topic. Nevertheless, economic factors are used both as causes and effects of current development trends. Media economics is also raised as a relevant issue by most of our interview subjects.
The decline in the editorial media’s economy began with the 2009 financial crisis and transitioned seamlessly into more structural changes. The most significant challenge for the media was competition for digital advertising revenues from the new global technology platforms, while at the same time, advertising and user revenues from print newspapers declined along with circulation.
Reduced editorial capacity
Norway and Sweden are among the few countries that managed to establish a functioning market for digital subscriptions, enabling compensation for some of the lost income. It’s quite evident that the weakened media economy has led to reduced editorial capacity, measured in both money and number of journalists to produce journalism.
However, it is important to note that the weakened media economy and decreased media consumption across several target groups are not directly correlated. Other key factors include alternative offerings from social networks, competition for people’s time, and the editorial media’s own ability and willingness to innovate and engage with users to adapt to a changing landscape.
When all four factors show a negative trend over the past 10-15 years, we can observe a correlation in their development. The most compelling question, however, is whether there is also causality between the different datasets, which we aim to explore.
Schibsted is based in Norway and Sweden, the two most atypical countries in Europe in terms of media development and democracy. This is mainly due to the fact that these countries lead global rankings in democracy indexes, media freedom indexes, living standards indexes, and digital maturity. They also have well-developed public media support systems. Therefore, we aim to avoid placing too much emphasis on experiences from our own geography during our interviews.
When it comes to innovations and improvements, we will discuss Nordic solutions that we believe are relevant for the rest of Europe.
Discussion on the relationship between reduced editorial capacity and the decline of European democracies
We have asked some of the interviewees to reflect on possible causality:
Professor Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, Head of Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the time of the interview, is the most skeptical among those we interviewed about this causality.
“I think it’s quite hard to establish that consistently, right? So, I’m just thinking of countries that are often held up as key examples of democratic backsliding. These would be Hungary, they would be Turkey, they would be, until recently, Poland.”
“I think it’s also important to recognize that several of these countries had comparatively robust and pluralistic media compared to many other societies. And that robustness and diversity was not enough to protect their independence once the governing parties began to really leverage the full power of the state to try to exercise media capture.”
“So I’m not sure that it would have made much of a difference had they been a little bit stronger. I think it’s very hard once a government starts deploying the full panoply of tools that unscrupulous political actors can use if they seek to control the media. So, would I have wished the Polish media to be stronger, or the Hungarian media to be stronger, or Turkish media to be stronger? Sure. But I’m not sure that would have prevented the backsliding that we’re seeing.”
The Hungarian Professor Gábor Polyák, of Media Law and Media Policy, Head of the Media and Communication Department at Eötvös Loránd University, and Head of the watchdog organization Mertek Media Monitor, has his own analysis of the strength and stance of the Hungarian media during and after Fidesz’s takeover in Hungary.
To our question, he responds:
“Of course, the media system is embedded into the political and social system as a whole. And in 2010, there was no real social movement against the first anti-democratic measures of the Fidesz government. And that was also what you would experience in the media field.”
“Public service media was one of the first organizations that announced loyalty to the Fidesz government. Even before the election in 2010, they started to be very friendly with Fidesz before the elections. And it means, of course, that the Hungarian media system, the media market, and the attitudes of journalists were not strong enough to defend or to resist this kind of attacks that started in 2010.”
“For a period the media market seemed to be strong because it was mainly owned by Western European investors. The big problem was that in 2008, because of the global financial crisis, most of these investors decided to leave not only Hungary, but the whole region. Our bad luck was that this was the time when Orbán came.”
“So, there were several media outlets on the market to be sold, and there was only one buyer, and that was the economic circle of the ruling party, Fidesz. It was very, very easy to expand on the media market for businessmen related to the ruling party.”
Professor Polyak believes this illustrates the weaknesses in the Hungarian media market prior to the 2010 takeover. Notably, he also points out that a significant portion of Hungarian journalists have become uncritical and loyal to the Fidesz government.
“Yeah, and so no one thought before 2010 that journalists can be turned into this direction. Now the majority of the journalists are also taking part in the functioning of this regime. They don’t think that they should be watchdogs. They think they should be loyal to the government and defend the interests of the government. This is not, how to say, the attitude of the journalists, what you want to see or what you can read in textbooks, ”says Gábor Polyák.
Assistant Professor Lambrini Papadopoulou, Faculty of Communication and Media Studies, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, criticizes the attitude and professionalism of large parts of traditional Greek media:
“In essence, what we have is a media environment in which the majority of media are interwoven with the Greek government and support its strategies, its narratives, its visions, its politics in general, and do not criticize them. And they are also supported economically via the government to do so, so there is no critical reporting. And at the same time, there are a handful of critical media that are trying to survive economically, and also they are trying to hold those powerful accountable for their actions. But it is a struggle.”
Why is it this way, do you think?
“There are various reasons. First of all, this is endemic to Greece’s media history. I mean, if you examine the way media used to function decades ago, they were very closely related to power itself. So, this is not a new trend. This has been a systemic issue for the Greek media. They have always been partisan.”
“But once again, if we also take into consideration other factors, such as the economic crisis that made the media more vulnerable, then the government became the most important funder for some of them. So, it was like a necessity for them in order to survive, to embrace the government’s narratives.There are a lot of factors that have contributed, but this is also a systemic issue.”
“This is more or less how the media used to function, by exchanging favors with those in power. Because essentially, they could never really survive on their own powers. Their business model was not successful. So they had to look for other kinds of revenue.”
Renate Schroeder, Director of European Federation of Journalists, largely agrees with Kleis Nielsen, but believes there is an additional factor that must be considered for some of the countries he mentions.
“The historical background for these countries is so important. It’s very clear that in new member states, as we still call them, even though they have been there for 20 years, countries coming from communism have a completely different view on media, on journalists, on public service media.”
“We may not have acknowledged that enough. We have Slovakia, we have the well-known problems in Hungary and Poland. But I mean, if you look at Bulgaria, if you look at Romania, Czech Republic, or Croatia , you see there are common problems everywhere. And when I look at Germany, my own home country, the former GDR and the West, there are also big differences.”
“It would be easy to say bad media, bad democracy, but it’s not that easy. There are many other factors included, and we have to take a holistic approach. With globalization, digitalization, and the unprecedented power of big tech, the world is getting more complex and more polarized on all levels. Journalists at their best can play a vital role of connecting, explaining and engaging diverse audiences. For that, public support on all levels is crucial.”
Professor Staffan I. Lindberg, Director of the V-Dem Institute, is not categorical when it comes to the causality between editorial capacity and democracy, however, he has strong opinions about the media’s responsibility to make democracy work.
“It’s huge. And when it comes to disinformation and all the lies that are being spread on the internet, it’s the media who have been best suited to deal with this historically. Democracy dies with the lies. That was my main message to the American Congress when I participated in the January 6th hearing. Democracy can’t survive in a situation where people are being flooded with lies that large segments of the populations start believing in. Even the simplest and most fundamental action in a democracy – casting a vote in an election – becomes meaningless if voters only have lies to contend with,” Lindberg says.
Thus, he believes that editorial media are critically important for preserving democracy, but at the same time, he questions the media’s current way of handling extreme political statements.
“I think the media sometimes seek “objectivity” to the point of absurdity. You have to stand up for democracy and the principles of democracy. When parties and leaders make anti-pluralist statements, the media should point this out. It must be within the framework of the journalistic code of ethics to speak truth to power and say that this proposal is anti-democratic. For this and for that. And when they present conspiracy theories and lies that are spreading on social networks, regular media must be clearer and harder on the side of the truth.”
Project leader Sofia Verza, of the Center of Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF), emphasizes changes in political culture in her response.
“On a general level I believe there is such a causality. However, it’s very difficult to prove. There are multiple factors at play, including the level of political polarization. Changes are happening in the political culture, citizens’ trust in traditional political parties is decreasing in many countries.”
Associate Professor Andrea Mangani, University of Pisa, shares his view on the relationship between democracy and journalism, while also pointing out the increased distrust in politics, regardless of the media’s actions.
“I’m convinced that there is a strong connection, a strong link between media freedom/media pluralism and democracy. At the same time, it is not possible to establish causality in the data you refer to. For Italy’s part, this is partly due to a political crisis that could lead to a lower level of democracy in itself. People no longer believe in politics and seek simple solutions.”
“It’s probably fair to say that 90-95 percent of what people think about the world, they have learned from the media. So, the most important thing, the starting point for the establishment of liberal democracies, is to ensure a pluralist media system.”
“And so, if we find that the media pluralism and media freedom has declined in the last 15 or 20 years, and then we observe a decline also in the estimated level of democracy in different countries, I’m inclined to believe that there is a strong connection between the two things.”
“Media plurality/media freedom and democracy cannot work separately. I cannot imagine a democracy without media freedom, and I cannot imagine media freedom without democracy.”
Professor Jan Christian Kalbhenn, Institute for Information, Telecommunications and Media Law, University of Münster and Darmstadt University of Applied Sciences, is uncertain about the causality of the issue, like the others interviewed. However, he is confident that it is not coincidental that the democratic level in Europe and editorial capacity are declining simultaneously.
“No, it’s not a coincidence. It’s more like I would say that the internet or the digitalization or the platformization, the algorithmization, whatsoever, is maybe like a driving force for both trends. The old media system, from our perspective, seems to have been quite stable and quite solid and quite strong. It might somehow have also stabilized democratic values and institutions. But it’s not fully adapted to the digital sphere. So, it needs more time to have this stabilization factor also on the digital side. The infrastructure is not fully developed, I would say.”
Professor Auksė Balčytienė, Vytautas Magnus University in Lithuania, believes that the reduced power of journalism is one of the crucial factors for analyzing the democratic backsliding. At a general level, she also argues that we should look more deeply and broadly to better understand the weakening of European democracies:
“I think in general, I would look at all epistemic organizations, schools, museums, libraries, and ask questions of epistemology in general. What is knowledge and do we value knowledge as such? And what kind of views or values do we have in our societies?”
Auksė Balčytienė’s analysis largely revolves around the convergence of what she characterizes as an information crisis and a social crisis. The information crisis pertains to the way reliable and useful editorial information is mixed with conspiracies and disinformation in an enormous overflow of information. Vulnerable groups, who may not have the financial means nor the interest in consuming independent editorial products that seem irrelevant, can easily become susceptible to a blend of truths and lies.
Florence Hartmann, Head of the Media Intelligence Service of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), is accompanied by her colleagues Dorien Verckist, Senior Media Analyst, and Léa Hermen, Media Analyst, in the interview.
Florence Hartmann and her team are cautious about establishing causality between reduced editorial power and the weakening of democracies in the EU. The Media Intelligence Service produced a report on Public Service Media (PSM) and democratic development in 2023. They used the term “associated with”. For example, one of the chapter titles is “Strong PSM are associated with a healthy democracy.”
The Media Intelligence Service is very focused on the conditions necessary for PSM to fulfill its public service mission in the future, says Florence Hartmann:
“It all starts with independence, really. Safeguarding the independence in the governance and in the funding of the public service media is really the cornerstone for the PSM to be trusted. And according to all the studies we’ve been doing about the connection between PSM, democracy, and polarization, trust is really the core element. It is all about the trust from the citizens. And that comes with independence from the political sphere.”
It is easy to understand Florence Hartmann’s emphasis on the independence of Public Service Media (PSM). These types of media are large and important players among editorial media. To illustrate, the total funding of PSM in EU27+UK+NO is EUR 36.03 billion, according to EBU. This includes both public and commercial sources of funding.
The significant influence of these organizations, combined with public ownership, makes controlling PSM one of the top action points in the unwritten playbook for illiberal leaders.
Public Service Media (PSM) is included in the studies and datasets we use in this analysis. For example, in the mapping of local news deserts in the EU, there are specific questions related to the presence of PSMs in the relevant geographies.
Dorien Verckist expands on Florence Hartmann’s reasoning:
“I would say personal relevance is the next step, then. First it is independence and trust, then it’s personal relevance. I think there’s an interesting gap between the perceived personal relevance and relevance for society. It shows that PSM is known to be a useful institute. But then when you ask about the usefulness for your own life, you see that it’s a bit less of a convincing idea.”
Marcy Burstiner, Editorial News Editor of News Decoder, responds by highlighting what she believes are the reasons behind the editorial media’s weakened position as defenders of liberal democracies.
“Profit demands have led to significant resources being taken away from creative journalism. This has resulted in newsrooms becoming too small, leaving large thematic areas uncovered. Consequently, the audience doesn’t find content that is relevant to them and turns their backs on the news media.”
“It’s a vicious cycle that further affects the funding of journalism and poses a real danger of journalism dying out. If journalism were properly funded, either through non-profit ownership or public media support, more topics and regions would receive better coverage, and the audience would see greater value and relevance in journalism. But that’s not the case right now, and this needs to change.”
The capability of editorial media and their mindset
Professor Rasmus Kleis Nielsen criticizes several media outlets for having a superficial and undocumented approach to the trends thought to drive democratic backsliding, and for their limited understanding of citizens’ needs and behaviors.
“It seems to me that much of the public, and probably a growing part of the public, does not see actually existing news as valuable. And because they don’t see it as valuable, they’re not willing to pay attention. And in situations where they see it as even negative in their lives, because it leaves them anxious, depressed, and doesn’t give them anything actionable or anything they can do about the problem being covered, they actually try to avoid it.”
Kleis Nielsen criticizes the media for ignoring large target groups, specifically mentioning women and people with low income and low education.
“I mean, first of all, we need to be clear that both declining news consumption and increasing news avoidance are not unique to younger people. These trends are more pronounced among younger people who don’t have a lifetime of socialization into habits of news consumption. In fact, we see many different groups, and often groups that I think we have reason to say are poorly served by established media historically, namely women, for example, but also people of lower levels of income and lower levels of education.”
“I shouldn’t say they’re actually avoiding the news. And I mean, I would just say that our research on these issues paints a pretty clear picture. Generally, much of the public would like to have access to news that keeps them up to date, helps them understand the world beyond personal experience and tries to hold power to account. Much of the public is not convinced that that’s what established media offer. And they often see established media as being not for people like them and not about people like them, not representing and respecting and reflecting people like them. And these concerns are not imaginary.”
“I mean, many of the groups that are more likely to be low news consumers and more likely to be active news avoiders have every reason to feel poorly represented in the news, which tends to have a sort of orientation towards more privileged parts of society, often sort of more middle-aged or older, heavily featured male voices, heavily featured voices of people who are at high levels of educational attainment. And in that sense, essentially part of the public have had a look at the news, not a thorough one, not a detailed one, not one exploring every possible source of news, but had a look at the news and concluded that they don’t seem to care very much about me, so why should I care about them?”
Renate Schroeder believes that it’s more than just age and education level that determines whether people feel included in or excluded from ongoing political processes. She argues that it also involves class affiliation, to some extent.
“For me, the 90s were very progressive, with positive changes. We now have a rise of the right wing because many people, especially the young, feel isolated, alienated, full of angst for their future. Ecological fears, wokeness, complicated gender language and identity questions lead them to the quest for simple answers, nationalistic narratives against “foreign” people and back to conservative values.”
“They don’t see themselves anymore protected in today’s societies. I’m sure this also has an impact on voting behavior, independent from the media. We have seen that in Sweden, we have seen that in Finland, and we have seen that in Denmark, all three countries where you still have very good independent media. However, I am convinced that the influence of social networks and their attention driven economic models play an enormous destructive role in dismantling our social contracts based on trust, confidence and social cohesion.”
Growing bigger on a melting ice floe
Karel Verhoeven, Editor-in-Chief at the Flemish-language newspaper De Standaard in Belgium, describes a situation familiar to many editors. Newspapers of record, whether center, left, or right, tend to serve citizens with moderate political views and emotions – generally highly educated, relatively affluent, middle-class professionals, often urban residents.
“It is not so much the younger audiences we struggle with. We succeed in connecting with them, through very successful podcasts, and with accessible subscriptions for minus 26, for example. But there is an odd contradiction. At De Standaard, we have been growing in circulation and in subscriptions for the past 20 years. Yet the politics we discuss, and which our readers adhere to, is the moderate politics of the center parties, left or right. ”
“This is seriously challenged by populist and radical parties. Look at the Netherlands, France, Germany, and so many other European countries. In the Belgian and Flemish elections of June 2024, the far right became the second biggest party. Not the biggest. With local elections in October 2024, in the major city of Antwerp for example, the communist far left gained momentum.”
“I sometimes have the impression that politically we are on a melting ice sheet. Doing well, but on a melting ice floe. Research indicates that once voters cross the bridge towards the far right, there’s hardly any coming back, because these voters also leave “our” sort of news, the moderate and critical news environment. You cross the bridge and you come into a different kind of information world. A place where we newspapers are no longer able to reach them. That is a bleak prospect, one we have to fight with all available journalistic means, tools, and media.”
Rasmus Kleis Nielsen believes that class divides in news consumption have become more pronounced than before because there are so many more choices.
“It’s important to think about what has changed. And I think that the main thing that has changed is that in the past, in a low choice media environment, a lot of people ended up getting a little bit of news along the way, even though they didn’t think very highly of it, because news was part and parcel of media that they use for other purposes. I gave the example of utility and service information.”
“These things are largely gone by now. People don’t come across the news incidentally unless they do so on social networks and in a few cases search engines and the like. So, the concept has changed. People have more choices. And those who don’t find it as valuable or even find it a net negative in their lives are exercising that choice.”
Different forces pull in different directions…and the clock is ticking
Since we began working on this report at the beginning of December 2023, the political landscape in the EU has shifted towards a partially illiberal far-right, though none have gained a majority in the EU Parliament. The extent of this shift largely depends on what one had anticipated. In our context, it’s worth putting a spotlight on the relationship between voters’ support for illiberal political forces and their relationship with editorial media.
Some interesting developments in this period:
- The Italian government has carried out replacements of leaders and TV hosts in the Italian Public Service Media company RAI.
- The government in Slovakia decided to shut down the country’s Public Service Media (PSM) company Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS) and replace it with the newly established company Slovakia Television and Radio (STVR).
These changes in PSM in both countries are interpreted as measures to take full editorial control of the journalism in publicly owned media. This follows the playbook of illiberal regimes down to the smallest detail. The first step in these governments’ efforts to control critical media is often to start with the PSM companies.
- In France, leading political groups have been accused of wanting to deconstruct public service media. A handful of billionaires have largely taken control of several of the country’s major editorial media, allegedly to use them to promote their private interests.
- Another measure impacting media framework conditions is now emerging in the Netherlands, where the government is raising VAT on media subscriptions from 9 to 21 percent.
- In Norway, ranked highest globally on the media freedom index by Reporters Without Borders, the government has also removed the VAT exemption for audio and video-based media subscriptions.
The primary task of editorial media is to help the population make informed decisions and choices based on facts, and to expose abuses of power in all forms. In other words, the media’s job is not to warn against supporting specific political parties but to shed light on what each party’s policies would mean in practice. This is challenging in situations where parties have a vested interest in keeping their plans undisclosed until they have come into power. While public support for social institutions such as courts and editorial media may vary, there is typically little to gain from campaigning to deconstruct these institutions upon taking power. As a result, such intentions are often under-communicated, which can, in turn, lead the media into a minefield.
For example, the media can point out that parties with similar values and flagship issues in other countries have significantly weakened democracy after coming into power. However, doing so may invite intense criticism from those unwilling to address the potential consequences of a party’s policies, leading to accusations that the “mainstream media” is campaigning for political opponents. This argument can strongly resonate with frustrated voter groups who feel that traditional media does not adequately represent their interests. Here, we see various forces pulling segments of society in different directions, making it uncertain which forces will prevail in each case.
Possible conclusions
In the first part of this analysis, we looked at and compared several different, relevant datasets. All datasets show a negative trend over the past 10-15 years. The trends show correlation, but causality remains uncertain.
So, the question is:
Do we believe there would be a more positive development for liberal democracies in Europe if editorial media had been stronger?
We can conclude that both external and internal factors have influenced the strength and capacity of editorial media over the past 15 years. When trust in editorial media declines, for example, we must assume that this is due to both the media’s own behavior and to the portrayal of the editorial media by external forces.
Economy, attention, digitalisation and agenda
Factors contributing to what many call an editorial media crisis include intense competition from the social networks and search engines provided by global tech giants over the past 10+ years. The 2008/2009 financial crisis also hit the media hard, transitioning almost seamlessly into the structural changes driven by social networks.
This competition drained traditional media of advertising revenue, with no possibility of replacing this loss with other income in most media companies. The new competition resides in the digital market, and as a natural result, the use of print newspapers has declined significantly. Digitalization, and the opportunities it has provided for on-demand services for both video and audio, has also reduced the consumption of linear TV.
As a result of this development, media finances have been significantly weakened, leading to repeated cost reductions and a reduction in journalistic capacity. Even in countries where the media have been more successful, primarily due to the rise of digital subscriptions and relatively well-structured media support schemes, resources are still far fewer than before, requiring tough prioritization. This may have resulted in journalism that is better than ever before. But at the same time, the resource situation has led to thematic and geographical blind spots in journalism and coverage gaps for major parts of society.
Another impact of social networks is the competition for people’s time and the decline in young people’s engagement with editorial media. This is likely the biggest strategic challenge facing traditional editorial media.
The competition from social networks is also a competition over who sets the agenda. Editorial media, long accustomed to being dominant agenda setters, have had to confront the reality that, over the past 10-15 years, entirely different institutions and individuals can now set the agenda by spreading content through networks. This has been positive, also from a democratic perspective, because it has made it possible for everyone to be heard and to create engagement. However, it also has negative side-effects when the opportunity is misused to spread lies, disinformation, and hate.
Digitalization and new technology have also provided important opportunities in the production of journalism. “Data-driven journalism” is a term that, among other things, means that technology helps journalists find and analyze large amounts of data, so that more journalism can be produced based on it.
Lack of political support
The degree of political engagement for free editorial media varies significantly from country to country. Our assertion is that the variation is greater than what should be acceptable for the EU as a political community. In some countries, there is a lively political debate about the media’s ability to fulfill its societal role, accompanied by robust measures to protect and support editorial media. In other countries, the media appears largely left alone, with little awareness about media diversity and other indicators of the media’s function in society.
In a final category, there is a deliberate dismantling of media deemed troublesome by authorities. We will revisit political challenges and opportunities at the end of this report.
The ability and willingness to innovate and adapt
It is not always easy to draw a clear line between external and internal factors. When competition from social networks causes a decline in much of editorial media’s advertising revenue, it originates from what must be considered an external factor. However, the ability to address this challenge is largely an internal matter.
To what extent are European editorial media engaging in innovation that adequately addresses the strategic challenges they face? The answer to this question comes down to subjective judgment. What some may consider sufficient, others might deem far too little. Based on the available studies discussed in this report, in addition to insights from each EU country, and in comparison to what is recommended in other industries, there is much to suggest that the pace of innovation in established media is far too low. It appears that the financial situation for a large number of media houses is so weak that they simply cannot afford to engage in innovation efforts. Of course, there may be other reasons for their lack of activity.
At the same time, there appears to be significant variation. Industry organizations tend to highlight those who drive the most innovation, which can present a somewhat skewed view of industry’s situation as a whole.
A prime example of a fundamental and essential business model change is seen in Norway and Sweden, where building a digital subscription market has, to some extent, offset the declining advertising revenue. In most other EU countries, there remains a low willingness to pay for digital journalism.
It’s striking when media researchers from two of the EU’s most vulnerable countries, based on the studied parameters, indicate that a significant portion of traditional media companies and journalists in their countries do not view critical journalism against their governments as their duty. It is also notable that essential critical journalism in these vulnerable countries seems to be carried out mostly by quite small journalistic startups rather than by traditional media.
Lack of trust
Editorial media are continuously enveloped in criticism and debate. Examples include claims that they avoid covering topics they should cover or that they cover issues that are not important to anyone. They may be criticized for being too negative, that they overdramatize, or that their coverage is unbalanced. This type of criticism is, in most cases, positive, because it shows that the audience is aware, critical of sources, and engaged.
However, there are two phenomena that threaten the very foundation of the editorial media’s ability to function as intended. In chapter one we took a closer look at the phenomenon of knowledge resistance. In short, this involves people, under certain conditions, ceasing to relate to facts—sometimes against their better judgment. The second phenomenon concerns the declining trust in editorial media. These two phenomena are also, to some extent, interconnected. The media can and should endure continuous debate about the work they do, but they cannot function if trust in them becomes sufficiently low or if a significant portion of the population stops relating to facts and knowledge.
Therefore, in our view, it is critically important that editorial media first make an effort to understand the driving forces behind knowledge resistance and declining trust, and then determine what they can do to address these issues. Strengthening user trust is essential and the mother of all improvement initiatives.
Competing forces
When we collect all the different threads in this analysis we must take into account that several different forces pull people and societies in different directions. Which forces “win” depends on the predisposition of the population and the nature of the relationship with, and trust in, the various forces at play.
Our starting point has always been that we believe people must have access to relevant, critical, and independent information about the society to which they belong to form their own opinions and actively participate in democracy. But this presupposes that such information (read: journalism) is readily available, that the information is being used, and that there is enough trust in this information to dare to use it.
It is unlikely that most supporters of extreme political forces do so because they want to weaken democracy; in some cases, the opposite may be true. Support for liberal democracy likely takes a backseat in people’s minds to priorities such as security, personal finances, children’s upbringing, and so on.
That said, there are reasons to be concerned about engagement when the deconstruction of democratic institutions starts to happen in practice. How is the majority’s engagement when courts are undermined, when LGBTQ rights are significantly reduced, or when media are punished if they do not cheer for the government? Or, for that matter, if an outgoing president encourages people to storm a government building to obstruct the peaceful transition of power?
We have titled this section of the analysis “Possible conclusions” – and this choice is intentional. The datasets underlying our analysis are largely qualitative. While guidelines were provided on how scoring or risk assessments should be conducted, the evaluations still heavily rely on subjective judgment.
The data in focus was collected from the 27 EU countries, and a few additional countries. For the Democracy Index and the Press Freedom Index, the United Kingdom and Norway were included, and in the Media Pluralism Monitor, five candidate countries were added. Thus, approximately 30 countries in Europe have been assessed. The differences between the various countries, and sometimes even within each individual country, are relatively large. The combination of these factors, along with the difficulty of proving causality, means that it is practically impossible to prove and that the conclusions cannot be considered more than assumptions based on a reasonable interpretation of the data and interviews. When we suggest likely conclusions, these are based on assumptions about what applies to most of the countries referenced, and to a lesser extent – or not at all – to the remaining countries.
Our point-by-point summary of possible conclusions
- Editorial media have likely lost influence among citizens in the EU over the past 15 years, leading to a weakened role in shaping societal development.
- This seems to be particularly true among young people, socioeconomically disadvantaged groups, and people in rural areas.
- Trust in editorial media has weakened in the EU in recent years.
- It is very difficult to determine the exact impact this has had on the weakening of liberal democracies in Europe and the rise of illiberal forces, and the experts we interviewed have varying opinions. However, it seems likely that it has had some impact, particularly in areas with a combination of latent social/political unrest and a weak editorial media presence.
- Some of the strongest traditional, independent media have the capacity and willingness to innovate, enabling them to likely maintain, and perhaps strengthen, their role and contribution to societal development with their communities.
- Another significant part of the traditional media landscape appears so weakened that it is unlikely to have the resources needed for recovery.
- Few, if any, traditional editorial media can expect to regain the societal role they held before the internet. Even if some strengthen significantly in key areas, they are unlikely to regain the agenda-setting “monopoly” they once held in the pre-internet era.
- A crucial factor for the development of the editorial function in European societies may be the emergence of new editorial media. We see promising examples of new ventures – often hyperlocal or based on new formats and ideas – that emphasize strong user interaction and flexible formats such as text, audio, or video, as key components.
- There is still strong potential in the concept of editorial media as defenders of liberal democracies, provided they can successfully redefine and reposition themselves. Achieving this will require collaboration among media outlets, media owners, and authorities.
These are topics we will further examine in Part 2 of this report
