Chapter summary
- Decades of progress in global democracy levels have been erased in recent years, bringing us back to where we stood in 1985. As of 2023, 71% of the world’s population lives in autocracies, up from 48% just ten years ago, according to data from the V-Dem Institute
- The level of democracy in EU Member States mirrors the global development. However, the EU countries began at a higher level of democratic development compared to the global average.
- Over the last 10 years in particular we have seen a clear negative development for democracies in the EU, coinciding with a period of significant reduction of the capacity of free, editorial media, and a setback for media freedom. However, the connection between these trends is far from certain and serves as a topic of discussion in this report.
In this chapter, we will look at how democracies in EU countries have developed over the past few decades. This is one of the most important datasets for the analysis, as it will later be compared with studies that describe how editorial media in Europe have evolved over the same period.
Since “democracy” is not a straightforward concept, we will dedicate some space at the beginning to explain different forms of democracy and to argue why, in this context, we have chosen to focus on what is referred to as “liberal democracy”.
About the V-Dem Institute, data foundation, organization, and methodology
The V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Institute at the University of Gothenburg is one of several academic institutions that monitors and regularly reports on the development of the democratic level in the world.
We have chosen to use V-Dem’s data in this report for several reasons:
- Thoroughly tested methodology
- Use of several verifiable variables in measuring the degree of democracy
- Large and educated organization working full-time with democracy monitoring
- Collaboration with an extensive global network of research colleagues
- Source of reliable data that is also widely used by other researchers
V-Dem Institute adheres to five concepts of democracy: Electoral, Liberal, Participatory, Deliberative and Egalitarian. These concepts are defined and outlined in V-Dems codebook, Measuring High Level Democratic Principles using the V-Dem Data (page 4 and 5) .
The electoral component of democracy
…embodies the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens through competition for the approval of a broad electorate during periodic elections. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, the electoral component is fundamental; without it, we cannot call a regime “democratic” in any sense. At the same time, we recognize that holding elections alone is insufficient, and also that countries can have “democratic qualities” without being electoral democracies.
The liberal component of democracy
…embodies the intrinsic value of protecting individual and minority rights against a potential “tyranny of the majority.” This is achieved through constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, and effective checks and balances that limit the use of executive power.
In this report, we primarily focus on the concepts of liberal democracy, in some cases set against, and compared with, electoral democracies. The other forms of democracy can be read about on V-Dem’s own pages.
Put simply, we understand the distinction between these two dimensions as follows: the “electoral” dimension primarily focuses on safeguarding majority interests through elections, while the “liberal” dimension also protects minority interests, even outside the electoral process.
In principle, this means that an electoral democracy exists so long as there are free elections, even if all other institutions in society, such as the judiciary and free media, are deconstructed. If one only measures the dimension of electoral democracy, countries such as Hungary and Poland meet the requirements, even though the principles of the rule of law and minorities are threatened in these countries. Therefore, we believe that the concept of liberal democracy provides a better understanding of what constitutes a well-functioning civilization, where human rights and minorities are protected.
Electoral or Liberal democracy frameworks are applied to a varying extent depending on the target groups for the reporting. According to the V-Dem Institute, there are some conservative leaders who believe the term liberal democracy lacks legitimacy and does not address what they consider the core of a democracy. This objection often arises from assumptions that measurements of liberal democracy place emphasis on the treatment of sexual minorities. However, this variable is not measured in V-Dem’s methodology.
Methodologically, when examining democratic development across a group of countries, those with a large population carry more weight than smaller ones. There, it is prudent to study the democratic level per capita. This means that population figures can impact the statistical outcome for democratic development. If autocratic countries increase their population significantly more than democratic countries, this will have a negative statistical impact.
The V-Dem Institute reports that it records five components within each of the five categories of democracy, with 26 indicators measured under each of those five components. Altogether, this provides over 600 data points.
Democratic development for the 27 EU countries, plus the United Kingdom and Norway
Overall, the level of democracy in the EU has evolved relatively slowly over time. Some countries have moved in a negative direction, while others remained static. This has resulted in an increased difference in the democratic level between the 29 countries we have studied.
Hungary, Poland, Greece, and Slovenia have had a particularly concerning development – a development that started in Hungary in 2008. Several other countries are likely at risk of moving in the same direction, primarily due to reduced trust in incumbent governments and a political shift towards the far right. On the other hand, some countries seem to be moving in a more positive direction, such as Poland after the latest Parliamentary elections. However, the political situation in Poland has not yet stabilized.
2010 the peak year
The figure below shows the development for the period 1993-2023, and partially captures significant improvements in democratic levels following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the subsequent wave of democratization in several Eastern European countries in the years that followed.
For easier readability, the 27+2 countries in the graphs below are grouped based on their initial democracy index scores at the beginning of the period. A dotted vertical line marks 2008, the starting point of particular interest for this analysis. We have chosen to focus specifically on the years after 2008, as this is when the crisis for editorial media truly began following the financial crisis of the same year. Later, this crisis transitioned into a prolonged phase of digital transformation, driven by competition with the global digital players, among other factors.
As seen in these graphs, the peak year for democracy in the EU was around 2010. Since then, the development has gone in a negative direction.
The vertical dimension is the value of the Liberal Democracy Index and it ranges from 0 to 1. All the graphs show the entire possible range, from complete absence of any feature of liberal democracy (0) to their complete and perfect presence (1).
In the graphs below, we zoom in on the period after 2008. If feelings of being left behind – along with the resulting frustration or apathy – are part of the explanation, then the next question is: how did we get here? And why are we witnessing deeper political divides and a greater polarization?
Professor Staffan I. Lindberg, Director of the V-Dem Institute, says the explanations are two-fold. The underlying basis for the anti-democratic movement has been shaped slowly over time. Research shows that individuals who fear for the future – as reflected in concerns about a bleak economic future, worries about children’s prospects, and a feeling of being left out – are more likely to vote for anti-democratic parties and leaders. The increase in such sentiments have made people more vulnerable to political leaders who know how to exploit it.
“It is clear that for almost all countries in the world that have regressed in terms of democratic levels over the past 20 years, it is parties and leaders on the far right of the political spectrum who are behind this. They are nationalistic and reactionary. Underneath, they are anti-pluralistic and anti-democratic. They are often populists, but it’s not populism that’s dangerous. There are plenty of populist parties that are democratic, and many parties tend to be more or less populist. It is not dichotomous, not clearly one or the other. Historical data shows that about half of populist parties do not pose a threat to democracy. Historically, anti-democratic forces have also been found on the left side of politics. But today, this is now rare, such as in Mexico,” says Professor Lindberg.
Lindberg discusses how the anti-pluralist leaders follow the same playbook and learn from each other. He also refers to their alliance with the leading religious undercurrents in their countries:
“Orbán in Hungary suddenly became a Christian, but had probably never been to church earlier in life. The first thing Putin did in Russia was to ally with the Russian Orthodox Church. Erdogan in Turkey suddenly became very Muslim and allied himself with conservative, reactionary Muslim forces in Turkey. The Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi became a Hindu nationalist. Trump formed a relationship in the USA with the Pentecostals, and Bolsonaro had close ties to similar religious groups. We can go down the line.”
Lindberg talks about how far-right, nationalist political leaders emphasize creating common enemy images, for example, blaming immigrants for unemployment or crime.
“The far-right shift in politics is spreading everywhere. It’s not only countries like Greece, India, Croatia, and Armenia, that are undergoing their de-democratization now, not to mention the USA. It’s downright frightening. The Nordic countries also have rapidly growing far-right parties, and in Sweden, we are seeing a quite radical shift in norms,” he says.
When the January 6 Commission of the U.S. Congress invited Staffan Lindberg to share his reflections on the background of the attack, he summarized it with, “Democracy dies with the lies,” and he spoke about the effect of social networks.
“Social networks are a double-edged sword. We all thought it would be good, but we know it isn’t. China, Putin, and the rightwing parties, and their support groups, from Infowars to online “newspapers” and sources we also have in the Nordics. They flood the system with disinformation and conspiracy theories. It is extremely dangerous. The unlimited freedom of speech online is being used today to undermine the freedom of speech and democracy,” Staffan Lindberg says.
